This paper contributes a theoretical framework to analyze how the labor market responds di¤erently to aggregate and sectoral shocks in the presence of search frictions and imperfect mobility. In contrast to the previous literature, which views sectoral shocks as exogenous shocks on matching e¢ ciency, the aggregate impacts of a sectoral shock are the endogenous outcome of the optimal hiring and moving decisions of …rms and workers. The model predicts that the economy features the following distinct responses to a structural change: 1) matching e¢ ciency drops and recovers slowly; 2) total vacancies …rst decrease and then overshoot their long-term equilibrium value; 3) the aggregate wage jumps while labor productivity drops during the transition; and 4) counter-intuitively, the impact on the overall unemployment is limited.
Introduction
The importance of identifying the source of unemployment cannot be overemphasized in terms of policy implications. The recent debate between aggregate demand and sectoral shift explanations for the surge in unemployment has underscored this importance. Based on the current high vacancy and unemployment rates, several authors have argued that there is a mismatch between the availability of workers and the requirements of employers. They further suggest that if stable relationships between vacancies and unemployment were still in place, then we would have a much lower unemployment rate given the current job openings. 1 However, the theoretical foundation of this argument is lacking. In order to draw conclusions on the impact of the structural shift, this paper develops a theoretical framework to identify the aggregate e¤ect of sectoral shocks and characterize the transition dynamics. We show that although the current observations can indeed provide evidence of a misallocation, one cannot justi…ably conclude that massive unemployment is driven by structural change.
Given the well-known fact that the labor market adjusts to a steady state relatively quickly, as implied by the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (DMP), the coexistence of a high vacancy rate and a high unemployment rate is often viewed as an exogenous shock to the e¢ ciency of the matching technology. Following this line of argument, it is often claimed that sectoral shocks are one of the sources of this exogenous shock. This approach for describing structural change is unsatisfying. Therefore, this paper contributes a two-sector model that captures both search frictions as well as imperfect mobility. The aggregate impacts of a sectoral shock in the framework are the endogenous outcome of the optimal hiring and moving decisions of …rms and workers. The paper therefore provides an understanding of both the short-and long-term aggregate e¤ects of sectoral shocks.
The long-term aggregate e¤ect can be seen from the steady state analysis, where we show that a higher dispersion of the technology will result in a lower unemployment rate. This paper further characterizes the transition dynamics and shows that if the TFP shock a¤ects di¤erent sectors unequally, then the economy will take a much longer time to adjust, which generates a much more persistent dynamic than that implied by the standard model. Within this better-founded model, we can answer the following questions directly. How does the labor market respond di¤erently to aggregate and sectoral shocks? In particular, what is the impact of a sectoral shock on the aggregate unemployment, vacancies, and wages during the transition path? And, more importantly, how much of the current unemployment rate can be explained by misallocation?
During the transition of a sectoral shock, the model predicts that the economy features the following distinct responses: 1) the aggregate labor productivity and aggregate matching e¢ ciency drop and recover slowly as the economy reallocates labor for best use; 2) aggregate vacancies …rst decrease and then overshoot their long-term equilibrium value; 3) the aggregate wage increases during the transition; 4) counterintuitively, the impact on the aggregate unemployment is negligible. Notice that, without assuming an exogenous shock to the matching e¢ ciency, the persistent movement in the aggregate matching e¢ ciency is endogenous in my model. More importantly, the model further concludes that a sectoral shock does result in the movement of the aggregate matching e¢ ciency, but does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the aggregate unemployment. Such a prediction is distinct from the implication of an exogenous shock to the matching e¢ ciency.
Furthermore, the aggregate responses of vacancies and wages to sectoral shocks are interesting themselves, given that they show distinguishable responses from aggregate shocks. A negative aggregate shock is expected to lead to a decrease in vacancies and wages. Instead, the dynamic response of vacancies to a sectoral shock features a lagged adjustment and a medium-term overshoot. Such a dynamic response is crucially driven by imperfect mobility.
Although the labor demand is high in the sector receiving a positive shock, the fact that few searching workers are located in the right sector limits a possible increase in job openings in that sector. The adjustment speeds up until the labor force reallocates to the good sector.
The reason behind why wages increase even as the aggregate labor productivity decreases is also intuitive. Although the workers in the declining sector have low labor productivity, their outside options of moving increase their bargaining positions, which in turn drives up the wages and reduces the drops in wages of the low sector. By combining the increases in wages of the high sector, the net e¤ect on wages is subsequently positive. The model therefore suggests that for any negative TFP shock that hits sectors unequally, the aggregate wage is rigid in the sense that it adjusts less than the aggregate labor productivity. However, this phenomenon arises even when wages are determined by Nash bargaining and no assumption of wage rigidity is imposed.
In order to formalize the two-sector model, it is crucial to introduce intra-…rm wage bargaining (…rst developed in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) ) into the DMP, so that the e¤ect of diminishing returns on labor allocation across sectors is captured. This is the key di¤erence from the standard search model. Furthermore, to my knowledge, this is the …rst paper to characterize the dynamic process that exists in an environment with intra-…rm wage bargaining. Contrary to the standard search model, current employment is now a relevant state variable to the …rm when solving its optimization problem. The equilibrium outcome of the market tightness is hence a function of the current aggregate employment in addition to TFP. Imperfect mobility is also explicitly captured in my framework in addition to the standard search friction. Workers act to maximize their expected payo¤, taking into account both the cost as well as the bene…t of moving. Hence, the speed of the reallocation process will also be endogenously determined in equilibrium. The paper is organized as follows:
Sections 2 and 3 characterize the steady state and dynamics, respectively, and Section 4 shows the simulation results and further identi…es the condition that necessarily results in the sectoral reallocation, which sheds light on the debate regarding the sectoral reallocation explanation for the cyclical unemployment.
Related literature
The empirical literature on the sectoral reallocation of labor is well documented in Aaronson et al. (2004) . Their paper compares di¤erent empirical measures of sectoral reallocation, including Lilien (1982) , Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , Rissman (1997) , and Groshen and Potter (2003) , etc. The seminal paper by Liline claims that sectoral reallocation is responsible for as much as half of the output volatility. Some critics, such as, Abraham and Katz (1986) , have argued against this view. The paper by Campbell and Kuttner (1996) also assesses the role of reallocation shocks in cyclical employment ‡uctuations under di¤erent identifying assumptions and they conclude that reallocation shocks account for over half of the variance in total employment. Di¤erent hypotheses obviously yield di¤erent results, and the disagreement seems to arise from the fact that the theoretical foundation of this longexisting debate is relatively weak. At this stage, the paper does not aim to argue as to which factor is more important in the past employment trend. The goal of this paper is to devise a model to study the e¤ects of aggregate shock and sectoral shock on the economy. The result shows that some measures proposed in the literature are inclusive in term of di¤erentiating between these two shocks.
Lucas Jr and Prescott (1974) , Rogerson (1987) , and Greenwood et al. (1996) propose early models of reallocation of labor due to sectoral shocks. Lucas characterizes the steady state, and Rogerson presents a two-period, two-sector version of the Lucas-Prescott model for which the equilibrium time path is characterized. The cyclical behavior of job creation/ destruction is further developed in Greenwood et al. (1996) . All of them share the same feature which dictates that if a worker wishes to move, then he or she is necessarily idle for one period. The moving workers obtain employment in the new sector in the second period in the Lucas-Prescott model and with probability p in Rogerson's model, where p is determined by the search intensity. Built on the existing search and matching literature, the probability of getting a job in this model is determined endogenously, and is governed by the equilibrium outcome of market tightness. One distinction of my model from previous one is that the joint determination of employment and market tightness in each sector, as well as the labor force reallocation, is explicitly characterized, both in the steady state and out-ofsteady state dynamics. As a result, the present model is general enough to draw conclusions on workers'and …rms'decisions corresponding to any type of shocks hitting the economy. This paper is also related to business cycles and labor-market search. A well-known study Andolfatto (1996) shows that incorporating the idea of labor-market search into a standard RBC model can improve the empirical performance along several dimensions. In the last part of his paper, Andolfatto considers brie ‡y the structural disturbances in the search economy, where it is modeled as an exogenous shock to the matching technology. The idea behind it follows the widely accepted view that a sectoral shift worsens the current match, and matching across sectors is more di¢ cult. The present paper provides a much more re…ned structure. Without imposing this exogenous assumption, the hiring rate is endogenously determined in equilibrium along with the labor reallocation. The concept in Phelan and Trejos (2000) is actually most similar to this paper. However, their study is limited to a sectoral demand shift, and they only solve the social planner's problem. The framework here is much more general and is also richer in the sense that workers'decisions are taken into account and the issue of imperfect mobility is considered.
The idea of imperfect mobility captures the fact that unemployed workers are usually attached to an occupation and a geographic location where job opportunities are scarce.
Moving to a new industry is costly even though these workers have incentives to do so, a phenomenon that results in a mismatch. The idea of mismatch has been emphasized by Shimer (2007) , who departs from the standard search theory and explains how unemployment and vacancies can be seen as a result of mismatch itself. Contrary to this work, our model explicitly captures the mobility cost and analyzes its resulting equilibrium outcome in a search and matching model. The paper is also related to the recent works on mismatch (Sahin et al. (2011), Herz and van Rens (2011) , Barnichon and Figura (2011) ), which provide a measure of "mismatch" in the labor market. Theoretically, this paper focuses the analysis on the impact of job creation and aggregate dynamics as a result of misallocation, which is distinct from the above works which assume a vacancies distribution.
The model I construct shares all of the standard tools developed in the search literature but with one modi…cation: introducing intra-…rm bargaining. Intra-…rm bargaining, …rst developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , takes into account the strategic considerations between marginal employees and incumbents and relations between capital owners and la-bor. This method has been further developed recently in works on wage dispersion such as Mortensen (2009) . Compared with the existing literature, this paper o¤ers two main contributions. First of all, to my knowledge, it is the …rst paper incorporating this concept into the two-sector aggregate model. Most related RBC literature which incorporates search frictions has excluded this strategic interaction. Ignoring this e¤ect may be safe in the one-sector aggregate model, but the analysis essentially breaks down in a two-sector economy 2 . Second, it is also the …rst paper to solve the dynamic adjustment within an intra-…rm bargaining setting. As pointed out by Cahuc et al. (2008) , the intra-…rm bargaining approach yields a good account of strategic interactions but with one limitation: it is static. This problem has been eliminated in this paper. This paper explicitly characterizes the dynamics, which yield a response di¤erent from the predictions of the standard framework of Pissarides (2000) .
Model
The labor market is composed of two sectors fi; jg with technology p i ; p j and a continuum of identical workers of measure one. The production function of sector i with n employed workers is then p i f (n i ), where f (n) has diminishing returns, assuming that f (n) = n ; 0 < only choose go to one of the sector o¤ering the hight tightness, given that workers' unemployed value,
The equilibrium of the two-sector models will not exist since it always collapse to one sector. This shows the motivation to introduce the diminishing return in labor productivity. The …rm's value in sector i can therefore be expressed as follows:
= max
where the law of motion of the employment follows _ n = m( ) v n and v represents vacancies (recruiting e¤ort). FOC yields:
J p (n) is de…ned as the value of the marginal worker to the …rm. By the envelope theorem and the market steady state conditions, _ n = 0; _ = 0 :
The worker's decisions are straightforward. Each worker simply chooses which sector i (market) to search and obtains a job o¤er with probability m( i ). With the market, the worker accepts the o¤er if and only if the employed value is higher than his outside option,
i.e, the value of continuing to search. Hence, the expected discounted value of an employed and an unemployed worker in sector i can be expressed as:
Wage Bargaining
The wage in each sector is determined by bilateral bargaining between the employer and each worker separately. Each is viewed as the marginal worker. The wage determination in this model borrows from the result of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) but is modi…ed into an environment with search frictions. The spirit of their analysis is based on contractual incompleteness, the inability of either party to commit to a future wage and employment decision. That is, any worker or the …rm can start wage renegotiation at any time before production takes place. Adding one additional worker, the …rm immediately gains (pf 0 (n) w) on the margin, but in addition, a wage renegotiation ensures with the remaining employee
n: Let denote the bargaining power of workers, the usual Nash-sharing rule
Combining equation (3) and (4) gives a system of partial …rst order di¤erential equations:
As shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , 3 the general solution to this di¤erential equations is:
With the Cobb-Douglas production of the form f (n) = n a ; 2 (0; 1];then the wage equation is also linear in average product per worker:
Notice that the wage pro…le is an one to one function of employment and is monotonically decreasing in n due to the property of diminishing returns in the production function. On the other hand, given the free-entry condition, (2), the sharing rules also implies:
Combining equation (5) and (6) gives the equilibrium relation between employment and market tightness:
In this environment, there are two consequences for wage setting: on the one hand, a …rm has the incentive to expand production so as to reduce the wage per worker, which depends on the marginal product. This is a partial equilibrium e¤ect. However, in general equilibrium, the higher demand for labor will improve the bargaining position-it will result a higher and, therefore, a higher U -and thus lead to a higher wages, as shown in (6) : (7) can be understood from (2) and (3) :
Using the language in the standard search model, this is Job Creation condition. Namely, the marginal value of hiring an additional worker equals the expected cost of posting a vacancy. Compared to the standard form,
; one additional match in this model increases the surplus by (pf 0 (n) @w(n) @n n) instead of p; taken into account the e¤ect of diminishing returns and wage bargaining, and this term is captured by the LHS of (7), 1 +
The result of RHS can then be derived from (r + )(
which is essentially the cost of having one additional match to the …rm. Hence, both (7) and (8) capture the idea that, in the equilibrium, the higher the marginal value of hiring one additional worker, the tighter the market.
Finally, the equilibrium level of unemployment needs to satisfy the following employment identity at the steady state:
where L i is the total work force in the sector i. Hence, given L i , a steady state in sector i is a pair (n i ; i ) satisfying two equations above.
Equation (7) is the job creation condition, the RHS of which is increasing in and the LHS is decreasing in n: Equation (9) is the identity condition, given the labor force in sector i, L i . The joint determination of and n is illustrated in Fig 1, given the workforce L 4 . The downward black curve represents the employment condition and the red curve represents the identity condition. As earlier explained, from (5), the wage portfolio is an one to one function of n. Corresponding equilibrium wages are therefore also uniquely determined,w(p i ; n i ):
Equilibrium Condition across sectors
The last section shows that given the workforce L i ; the steady state and n (therefore w (n)) is uniquely determined in each sector. One more equilibrium condition is therefore needed in order to pin down the labor allocation among sectors. This can be derived from the fact that the unemployment value has to be the same among sectors, that's,
This condition has to be satis…ed since unemployed workers have to be indi¤erent between searching in two sectors in the equilibrium.
Hence the equilibrium condition is simply:
One can conclude that the higher vacancies cost, the lower market tightness. This is also saying that if the vacancy cost is the same across sectors then, at equilibrium, the market tightness has to be the same as well, regardless of di¤erent TFP.
Combining this condition plus two steady state conditions within each sector from section 2.2, I then am able to pin down …ve unknown variables f i ; j ; n i ; n j ; L i g from …ve equations:
The steady state equilibrium in the two-sector model is
isfying following …ve equations,given the total productivity fp i ; p j g: The key insight can be gained from an easiest environment where the vacancy cost is the same across sectors, that is c(p) = c: From the equilibrium conditions above, one can easily
1= (1 ) 1 + ( Clearly, a sudden drop in p in the sector i will lead to decrease in the market tightness if labor allocation L i remains …xed. This change will then lead i < j ; which violates the p j drops to 1.5 from 2. Namely, the work out ‡ow from sector i to j is ( will move from sector i to sector j. This movement will then increase the market tightness of sector i while decrease the one of sector j. The economy will reach the equilibrium until the equilibrium condition holds again. The detailed of the transition dynamics is characterized in Section 3. I now …rst establish the comparative statics results for the steady state.
In the new equilibrium, there will be less employment and labor force in the shrinking sector; the market tightness in the other sector has to decrease and the employment has to increase due to the labor in ‡ow from the shrinking sector. Furthermore, total number of unemployed workers can be expressed as:
:Since we have concluded that i = j at the equilibrium in this simple environment, the aggregate unemployment is given by U total = +m( ) ; which is decreasing in : Notice that di¤erent TFP dispersion ( i.e., TFP ratio) will have an aggregate e¤ect on the level of the aggregate unemployment, even without an aggregate TFP shock. The model therefore predicts that the sectoral shocks can have long term aggregate e¤ects. In fact, as established in the following proposition, the higher the TFP ratio, the lower the total unemployment. The intuition is that, given the economy reallocates the labor force to the better technology, the aggregate labor productivity e¤ectively increases even though the aggregate TFP is …xed. An increase in the aggregate labor productivity therefore leads to a lower aggregate unemployment rate.
Proposition 1 In a two-sector economy, where, p H = gs; p L = g=s; given an aggregate TFP denoted by g; the higher the sectoral shock s, (i.e, the higher ratio of p H p L ), the higher the steady state market tightness and the lower total unemployment rate .
Proof. See Appendix C.
A more general case
Formally, one can derive the expression of 
This is saying that an increasing in productivity does not only lead to a higher expected pro…t but a higher marginal cost of opening a vacancy as well. That is, the convex vacancy cost has an o¤set e¤ect of an increasing p. Throughout the paper, I
assume
One can interpret this assumption as that …rms still …nd it pro…table to hire more workers when there is an increase in productivity even facing a higher marginal cost of a vacancy. Consequently, an increase in p shifts the employment determination condition to the right. And this e¤ect is smaller when c 0 (p) is larger. Hence, for any …xed L, an increase in p will lead to higher market tightness and employment.
Similar intuitions learned from the simple environment holds here. The change induced by a sudden jump of p i will then lead to a violation of the equilibrium condition i c(
if labor allocation L i remains …xed. From this condition, one can expect that either i has to decrease or j has to increase, in response to a jump of p i : The productivity of sector j remains constant so the employment condition does not shift. Therefore, the adjustment has to be done through the labor reallocation. Given the comparative statics result of the labor force, @ @L < 0; the reallocation has to be done through a labor in ‡ow from sector j to i .
; unemployed workers will move from sector j to sector i.
The economy will reach the equilibrium until the equilibrium condition holds again. Hence, in the new equilibrium, there will be more employment and labor force in the expanding sector ; the market tightness in the other sector has to increase and the employment has to fall due to the labor out ‡ow to the expanding sector.
3 Out-of-Steady-State Dynamics
The discussion of the preceding sections focuses entirely on the steady state. However, from the law of motion of the employment and the forward-looking rational expectations behavior by …rms and workers in wage determination derived from this model, one is able to examine the implications of these assumptions for the dynamic behavior of the economy out of the steady state. This section characterizes the transition dynamics of the reallocation process. It demonstrates how the labor market responds di¤erently to aggregate shocks and sectoral shocks. In particular, I analyze the impact of a sectoral shock on the aggregate unemployment, vacancies, and wages during the transition path.
Recall from the standard search model Pissarides (2000) , job vacancies, market tightness and wages are all "jump" variables under two assumptions. First, …rms have to be able to open up or close vacancies instantaneously so as to ensure that the value of a new vacancy is always zero. Second, the …rm and the worker can renegotiate whenever new information arrives. The dynamic behavior of unemployment, on the other hand, is governed by the matching technology; therefore, the only predetermined variable is the unemployment. The model developed here shares the same assumptions. The implied dynamics, however, are di¤erent for the standard model for the following aspects. The …rst key di¤erence is that the labor productivity, which is treated as an exogenous variable in the standard model, will be endogenously determined by the reallocation process. Hence, the labor productivity evolves over time during the transition as it takes time for the economy to reallocate the labor to its best use. As a result, the market tightness and the wages no longer jump to their steady state following a one-time permanent shock, as which is implied by the standard model. Instead, they also adjust along the path since both of them are functions of labor productivity.
One Sector Model
Before turning to the complete analysis, it is useful to see the dynamics in one sector model, as it makes a clear comparison with the standard model and also facilitates later analysis of a two-sector model. As before, a …rm chooses to post vacancies optimally. In a rational expectation equilibrium, a …rm takes as given, which is a result of the "market" and has a belief about the law of motion of the market tightness, which is denoted by G(p; N; (N; p)): Same as before, the level of the employment n is the state variable and p is drawn by "nature", which represents the technology shock in our model. The representative …rm's problem, that is (1) ; can therefore be rewritten as:
Notice that aggregate employment N does not directly enter the …rm's value function.
This is because that the only market outcome the …rm cares about is the market tightness.
However, from the previous analysis, equilibrium market tightness is implicitly a function of the aggregate employment, N; as well as TFP, p 7 :
The solution of the representative agent's problem is therefore a decision rule:
To make the representative agent representative, one impose N = n after solving the decision problem. The actual law of motion is
and the actual law of motion of market tightness is:
De…nition 2 A rational expectation equilibrium in one sector model is a policy function h, an equilibrium market tightness (N; p); an actual aggregate law of motion G A and F A ; and a perceived aggregate law of motion G and F such that a) Given G and (N; p); h solves the representative agent's optimization problem; b) h implies F = F A and given (N; p) ,
The main task is then to derive G( ) and F ( ) so one can know how variables adjust out-of-steady sate. As before, FOC of the …rm's problem yields:
This condition has to be held under the …rst assumption. Simply, the bene…t of posting a vacancy has to equal its cost. The value of another marginal worker is:
Note that the additional term (V nn _ n + V n _ ) can be expressed as _ J t (p; n); the expected gain from changes in the additional worker value during adjustment. This term is no longer zero since _ n 6 = 0 and _ 6 = 0 out of the steady state. The arbitrage equations of U and W out-of-steady-state are:
Therefore, similarly as previous sections, from the sharing rules, the wage determination can be derived as follows 8 :
Given U W = 1 J; the last term, _ U _ W , has to equal 1 _ J: Moreover, _ J can be derived from FOC:
Use this relationship to substitute _ U _ W . Equations above together with the law of motion of employment describe the dynamics of the economy as an autonomous systems:
8 See detailed derivation in Appendix A where g( ) =
with the assumption m( ) = :
Notice that the law of motion of the market tightness e¤ectively represents how joint surplus evolves, which can also be rewritten as the following, where
In the case of one sector model, L is …xed so that this non-linear system can then be solved with the standard approach. The solution of interest, = (N ; p); thus solves the di¤erential equation:
It is well known that a unique continuos solution exists to this equation for all N 2 [0; L] if and only if the ODE system composed of (14) and ( One can gain a understanding of how transition to the new steady state takes place when the economy is hit by a permanent shock. Consider, for example, if there is a positive shock, the economy starts with n o < n ss ; the employment grows and the growth rate decreases until it converges to the steady state value. Market tightness, on the other hand, jumps to some value higher than the steady state value and decreases over time until it reaches s :
In other words, if the state is "under-employment", that is n t < n s ; the market tightness has to be higher than its steady state value, that is, > s : This intuition is that "underemployment" means the marginal value of an additional worker is higher than the steady state, which encourages …rms to post vacancies; hence, the equilibrium market tightness is higher than the one in the steady state in order to keep …rms indi¤erent. That is, to satisfy the FOC (2).
It is important to note that this dynamics have a di¤erent implication from the canonical model. In the standard model, it is well known that market tightness is a jump variable and is a function of current labor productivity, which is taken exogenously. It can be seen as a special case of our model when the production function is linear, = 1: The model, however, takes into account the fact that the labor productivity will change over time endogenously.
That is, along the path, the …rm adjusts optimally the input given the diminishing return of labor. This result might not be quantitatively important in the one sector model; however, it plays a crucial role regarding the e¢ cient allocation across two-sectors.
A Two-Sectors Model: Reallocation and Mobility Cost
As we have learned from the steady state analysis, facing a sectoral shock, unemployed workers will reallocate to a relatively productive sector. This is because a relatively productive sector has a higher demand for labor. Hence, unlike the one-sector model (where L is …xed), the labor force in each sector L i t must adjust over time. In order to fully characterize the dynamics of the two-sector system, I now specify how workers reallocate to the other sector responding to the shocks. To capture the idea of imperfect mobility, I assume that it is costly for an unemployed worker to switch sectors. Furthermore, the switching rate, modeled as the standard Poisson rate, depends on the payment or the e¤ort made by the worker. Such a construction captures the idea that workers need to pay the training cost for the new skill or some other possible moving cost in order to enter a new industry. Given the value gained from moving, agents choose their e¤ort optimally; hence, the switching rate is endogenously determined. The value of an unemployed worker in sector i is characterized by the following optimization problem:
where C( ) represents the cost function, with C(0) = C 0 (0) = 0; C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0.
Obviously, given that switching is costly, only workers who enjoy a lower level unemployment value have an incentive to move. That is, if labor reallocation takes place, the labor ‡ow must move toward the sector that o¤ers a higher unemployment value. ; and s > 1: Within each sector, the job creation condition shifts immediately responding to the change of p i . As explained earlier, if the labor force remains constant, both the market tightness and therefore the unemployment value in sector H increase. Vice Versa, both decrease in sector L: Naturally, unemployed workers in sector L now have incentives to move to sector H but not the other way around.
The optimal e¤ort choice in each sector therefore satis…es the following:
Obviously, the …rm's optimization problem is the same as that in the one-sector model.
The wage equation in sector i can therefore be derived similarly as before.
and
where
; representing the extra value gained from switching sectors. This term raises the unemployed value and therefore also increases the wages. Finally, to close the model, we assume the cost function takes the following form for simplicity: To solve for the dynamics of the whole system, we essentially have to track the dynamics of six variables fn
sector, the labor allocation across sectors, as well as the endogenous switching rate.
On Endogenous Separations: Note that this framework can further account for endogenous separations. Following the standard job destruction developed in (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) ), …rms have the option of closing jobs at no cost and therefore a …lled job continues in operation for as long as its value is above zero. Hence, the separation occurs if and only if the shock makes the surplus negative. In this model, the surplus is a function of the current employment due to the diminishing return. As a result, if the shock makes the total surplus negative, the separation has to solve S(n 0 ) = 0. Observe that, following a sector-speci…c shock, the possibility of such a destruction can only arise in sector L. Furthermore, the destruction occurs immediately when the shock arrives. Therefore, the new level of the employment n 0 necessarily solves S L 0 (n 0 ) = 0, where the expression for the surplus in sector L is given by:
Notice that whether such a separation occurs depends not only on the level of p L but also the job opportunity in sector H, which governs a worker's outside option M L t : When the sector-speci…c shock is large enough to render the surplus of sector L negative, the level of the employment drops to n 0 at t = 0 so that S 
A Dynamic Programming Formulation
The decentralized outcome will clearly not solve the social planner's problem, since there are two sources of ine¢ ciency in the decentralized market: search externalities and overemployment, which is an additional source of ine¢ ciency driven by intra-…rm bargaining.
where represents the over-employment factor (1
It is well-known that search externalities generally exist in a searching model, except when the Hosios conditions (1 = m 0 ( ) m( ) = ) holds, which internalizes search externalities.
Notice that, however, the above dynamic programming is not the social planner's problem because of the over-employment factor, : This type of factor is another source of ine¢ ciency in the model with bilateral intra-…rm bargaining. As pointed out by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) , the bilateral intra-…rm bargaining solution provides an incentive for employers to "over employ" in order to drive down the marginal cost. Hence, one needs to take into account the over-employment factor in order to establish the equivalent dynamic programming problem.
4 Results / Discussion 4.1 Simulation: An increase in the sectoral shock
To emphasize the aggregate e¤ect of the sectoral shock itself, the following stimulation assumes that both states were in the steady state and had the same TFP, (s i 1 = 1 for i 2 fH; Lg); considers a permanent increase in sectoral-speci…c shocks (s H = z > 1 and
). In order to compare the result with the existing literature on cyclical employment, we now de…ne average labor productivity as P t
The magnitude of the sectoral shock is now chosen so that there is a 5% increase in the aggregate productivity in the new steady state. The transition dynamics are illustrated in the …gure below. its labor to the better technology. Hence, an increase in the sectoral shock z, i.e. the TFP ratio p H p L , leads to an increase in P t and consequently the total employment rate.
On the Beveridge Curve
To understand how the labor market responds di¤erently to sectoral shocks and aggregate shocks, I compared the transition dynamics on a Beveridge Curve. The …gure on the left shows the transition dynamics responding to a permanent increase in sectoral-speci…c shocks
) and the …gure on the right shows the transition dynamic responding to a permanent aggregate shock. Respond to aggregate shocks Similar to the previous situation, the magnitude of these two shocks were chosen so that there is a 5% increase in the aggregate productively in the new steady state. Of note, the movement responding to the increasing sectoral shock generates a persistent deviation from the Beveridge Curve. However, in contrast to the response to an aggregate shock, sectoral shock leads to an increase in the vacancy rates during the transition, and it takes a much longer time for the economy to return to the steady state. This result also sheds light on the discussion regarding the shift of the Beveridge Curve, which is usually explained by an exogenous change in the separation rate or the matching e¢ ciency. Without relying on these exogenous assumptions, the period of high vacancies with a small decline in unemployment is mainly driven by "misallocation" in our model. Since it takes time and resources for workers to enter the new sector, this additional friction results in a further delay in matching. In this sense, the matching e¢ ciency decreases endogenously.
Sectoral Shifts and its impact on Aggregate Unemployment
As discussed in the steady state analysis, the sectoral shock has a long-term e¤ect on the aggregate unemployment. The previous simulation further shows that sectoral shocks result in a persistent dynamic. Now, the question of interest is whether such a structural change leads to a high unemployment rate in the economy as a result of misallocation. In order to isolate such an e¤ect, I now considered a pure sectoral shift in the economy so that there is no change in the aggregate level of unemployment at the steady state. In other words, the productivity of sector H becomes low and sector L becomes high. Counterintuitively, the following proposition shows that, although a sectoral shift leads to misallocation and a persistent dynamic, it does not increase the level of the aggregate unemployment. In contrast to most arguments in the literature, which observe sectoral shifts worsen the matches and conclude that unemployment must rise, this model shows that it is not justi…able to conclude that structural change alone can lead to massive unemployment. The above result should be expected from our steady state analysis, given that the steady state labor force is only a function of the ratio of TFP, p i p j ; as shown in (10) : Hence, one should expect that any shock resulting changes in the TFP ratio will induce labor reallocation. Furthermore, the following argument identi…es the necessary conditions under which no reallocation takes place. Without labor reallocation, it has to be the case that
and therefore,
thus the di¤erential equation of market tightness can be simpli…ed as:
so the employment relations between two sectors are: n l (t) = n l (t) for all t. First, this immediately shows that this system can be sustained if and only if the initial condition satis…es n l (0) = n l (0): Since the initial employment value of two sectors satisfy the steady state condition, 0 n l ss = n h ss ; where 0 is the TFP ratio before the shock, this condition holds if and only if = 0 : Namely, the TFP ratio stays the same. To be concrete , in the case where p i = gs i , it is clear that there is no need for labor reallocation in response to any aggregate shock 10 . In the environment constructed here, the sector will respond to the aggregate shock as if a one-sector economy, given a …xed workforce,L i : This conclusion depends on how the aggregate TFP is de…ned. In this set up, the results support the …ndings 10 An example of aggregate shocks is shown in Appendix D.
of Liline (1982) In order to distinquish between these two shocks, Katz proposes to use the information on the job vacancy. They argue that both pure sectoral shift and aggregate demand scenario can cause a positive relation between t and unemployment. However, the pure sectoral shift generates a positive relationship between t and vacancies, but the aggregate demand, on the other hand, generates a negative relationship.
Based on the canonical model, they argued that holding the structural composition …xed, an increase in unemployment rate that is caused purely by a negative shock to aggregate demand should be accompanied by a decrease in the job vacancies. Namely, they see this as a movement along a …xed Beveridge curve.
On the contrary, changing in the sectoral shift can shift the entire UV curve either inward (improvement of matching) or outward (worsening of matching) ; therefore, interpreting that increased dispersion is due to a worsening of matching, they argue that the unemployment rate should be accompanied by an increase in the job vacancy rate in the case of a sectoral shift. This argument, however, does not hold here. For example, in the case which the sectoral shock decreases the TFP ratio, unemployment rate goes up both in the short run and long run and the dispersion of employment rises. However, the aggregate vacancies rise at the beginning but decrease in the long run. This scenario will be misidenti…ed as aggregate demand shock in Abraham's method .
shock. Importantly, the model shows that the higher the TFP ratio, the lower the total unemployment, given the same aggregate TFP. Taking into account the workers'.decision with the existence of imperfect mobility, the model fully characterizes the equilibrium dynamic path to the steady state. The result of a slow adjustment that responds to the shock arises from the fact that it takes time to hire new labor (standard search frictions) and, moreover, it takes time for workers to move to the expanding sector. The dynamics of the market tightness have a di¤erent feature implied by the standard model and provide new implications for cyclical ‡uctuation. The results show that some identi…cation assumptions, which have been used in the empirical literature, are inclusive in terms of di¤erentiating a sectoral shock from an aggregate shock.
This theoretical framework provides a better foundation for both the long-existing debate and the current discussion of the e¤ect of sectoral shift on aggregate unemployment. The model shows that 1) indeed, the movement of matching e¢ ciency can be seen as evidence of misallocation; and 2) it is not justi…ed to conclude that structural change alone can lead to massive unemployment. This result further highlights that it is not su¢ cient or correct to interpret structural change as a negative exogenous shock to the matching e¢ ciency. One nice feature of this developed framework is that it is broad enough to allow for the following extensions, which are currently works in progress: 1) expected cyclical shock; 2) endogenous capital, (i.e., introducing a …rm's choice of investment); and 3) search on the job. Although key insights can be gained from our basic analysis presented here, all of these described extensions are important in order to place this developed framework into a full business cycle model. This is the expected next step for future research. 
More Detail on the Autonomous System
After the linearization, the system can be approximated as a linear system with constant coe¢ cients:
dXt dt transformation u = V 1 X; where V is a nonsingular (constant) matrix. Hence X = V u and the di¤erential system can be rewritten as :
According to the theorem 2 from Struble (1962) , if the n characteristic numbers of the system are distinct, then there exists a nonsingular matrix V such that Step 1: De…ne X 0 = (X x s ) Evaluate Jacobian matrix A from (??) at the steady state, which, fortunately, is full rank with two positive and two negative eigenvalues.
Step 2: Use the two eigenvector (V 1 ; V 2 ; V 3 ) corresponding to the negative eigenvalues ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) to construct the base of the nonexplosive solution:
X 0 (t) = c 1 V 1 e 2 t + c 2 V 2 e 2 t + c 3 V 3 e 3 t
Step 3: Solve three unknown coe¢ cients with three initial conditions (n 
where L(s) = s 2= ( 1) 1+s 2= ( 1) :After some algebra, one can show that LHS is increasing in s and RHS is increasing in : Hence, is increasing in s: Let H denote the Hamiltonian. The optimality then requires:
Let c(e) = c T e , the optimality conditions can be rearranged as:
Compared to the original problem, where
